Tuesday 2 June, 15.45
Lecture Theatre, Manor Road Building
Please note earlier start time
Limit to Win It: A Typology of Competitive Arms Control Practices
Dr Sam Seitz, Oxford University
Arms control is traditionally conceptualized as a cooperative undertaking, reducing risk and obviating the need for wasteful expenditure. But arms control can also be employed for competitive ends, shaping competition in ways that asymmetrically advantage certain parties. While previous literature has identified individual examples of competitive arms control within certain cases, the full range of competitive arms control practices has not been assessed comprehensively. This paper aims to advance the literature by developing a typology through which to categorize and conceptualize eight competitive arms control practices, identifying four mechanisms and two potential target types. The paper first illustrates the validity of the framework by offering illustrative examples of each cell within the typology from various periods of nuclear arms control. It then applies the typology to reevaluate naval arms control in the interwar period, revealing the degree to which national decision-making was driven by competitive, not cooperative, interests. By generating a comprehensive typology of competitive arms control strategies, this work provides a framework through which to reassess historical arms control regimes and from which to evaluate the potential for future arms control under the shadow of renewed great power competition.
Sam Seitz is a Postdoctoral Fellow at Oxford's Department of Politics and International Relations and a Deterrence Futures Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute. He was previously a Stanton Nuclear Postdoctoral Fellow at MIT, where he was affiliated with the Security Studies Program. His work primarily concerns the causes and consequences of states' military procurement choices and the effect of these choices on alliance politics. Sam has worked at the British Embassy to the US, served on the editorial board of the Georgetown Security Studies Review, and worked as a Summer Associate and Adjunct Researcher at the RAND Corporation.
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